Introduction
Today "monetary policy" should be more aptly named "interest rate policy" because policymakers pay virtually no attention to money.
1 Prominent monetary/macroeconomic economists such as Woodford (2000 Woodford ( , 2003 Woodford ( , and 2008 , Friedman (1999) and King (1999) have suggested the possibility of a moneyless economy: Friedman and King argue that the absence of money would severely limit the effectiveness of monetary policy; Woodford argues that it would not. In a similar vein, Svensson (2008) suggests that over the past 50 years monetary theorists and policymakers have learned that "monetary aggregates matter little, or even not at all, for monetary policy." 2 1 This is true of virtually every central bank; however, the focus here is on the Federal Reserve.
Given the prominence of these economists and the lack of interest in money by central bankers around the world, one might think it foolish to assert that money is essential for economic activity and monetary policy. It will no doubt seem even more foolish to suggest that monetary policymakers' ability to influence interest rates, especially those that matter for the efficacy of monetary policy, is greatly exaggerated. This paper is an attempt to motivate discussion and debate about the essence of monetary policy. It is often fruitful to have such debates.
It may be particularly useful now because the Federal Reserve and most other central banks ignore money and are pursuing unconventional monetary policies in an effort to enhance the effectiveness of countercyclical policy. Challenging orthodoxy is useful even if it only serves to solidify one's belief in it.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 argues that money is essential for economic activity and is critical for determining the price level. Section 3 suggests several reasons why money's critical role for economic activity and monetary policy, as discussed in Section 2, is not reflected in modern macroeconomic models. Section 4 analyzes several reasons to be skeptical of the extent to which the Federal Reserve affects interest rates. 
Why Money Matters
Section 5 concludes.
The fundamental importance of money for economic activity and welfare is most easily seen by first considering an autarkic economy. Everyone is self-sufficient so there is no trade and, hence, money would not exist. Individuals get utility from consumption and leisure, where leisure is the amount of time not spent in the production of consumption goods. Individuals produce consumption goods using their share, , 0 1, 1, 2,..., The effect of trade using barter as the sole means of exchange is illustrated in Figure 2 . Economic welfare increases from * U to * U ′ as society goes from autarky to an exchange economy. The upward shift in the utility contour is due to Ricardo's principle of comparative advantage-everyone who trades is better off, while those who don't are no worse off. Because exchange is costly, society's welfare gain is less than the vertical shift from U to U ′ at * R . The difference represents the fact that some of society's resource is used in trade.
The fact that barter is costly means that society could be better off if there were a more efficient method of exchange. The only alternatives are credit and money. Credit is where one individual obtains a quantity of a commodity from
another by promising to pay that individual a quantity of the same or a different commodity at a future date: Credit is inter-temporal barter. Credit will tend to be less efficient than contemporaneous barter because of the addition waiting time.
Moreover, unlike barter, credit is accompanied by the default risk.
Money, on the other hand, is a commodity that is chosen to be a general medium of exchange: All goods (including credit contracts) are exchanged for money:
That is, money is a social contrivance that significantly reduces the transactions costs associated with barter (or credit). Figure 3 shows the effect of moving from barter to money. The upward shift in the utility contour is due to the fact that more trade takes place because money reduces the cost of exchange. The volume of trade could also increase because the use of money increases the range of relative prices over which transactions can occur, which increases the likelihood that an exchange will occur (Thornton, 2000) . Of course, increased trade leads to increased specialization and more trade. By reducing exchange costs, money frees up resources for production (or leisure). The net effect of the social invention of money is a marked rise in economic welfare. 4 However, because the stock of money is costly to produce and maintain, there is some welfare loss relative to a world where either trade or money is costless.
5
4 Thornton (2000) shows why money cannot be a private good. 5 Thornton (2000) speculates that such costs contributed to the evolution to fiat money systems.
Economic welfare depends enormously on trade, and the use of money increases both the efficiency and volume of trade. Therefore, money is crucial for the functioning of markets for the simple reason that, of the three possible means of exchange-barter, credit, and money, money is far and away the most efficient.
6
Barter has the property that it guarantees final payment-a good that one does not want is exchanged for the desired good, the trade is complete. Money also guarantees final payment. A good that one does not want is traded for money which can be easily traded for the desired good. While the use of money requires an additional transaction, the trade is effectively complete when the good is exchanged for money; the use of money essentially guarantees that no more than two transactions will be required to exchange something you don't what for something you want. It is money's property of guaranteeing final payment that enables it to serve as a generalized medium of exchange.
Because of the widespread use of credit to make transactions in modern economies it is important to understand that the predominance of credit is due to the existence of money. In a world without money the use of credit would be severely limited for two reasons. First, of the three means of exchange-barter, credit, and money-credit is far and away the least efficient: A credit transaction would require the exchange of a good for the promise to receive a larger quantity of the same good or a other quantity of another good at a future date, when the good received would be exchanged for the desired good.
7
The second, the use of credit for inter-temporal trade would be limited for the same reason that barter is limited for intra-temporal trade. The use of money greatly Clearly credit is inferior to barter in facilitating exchange.
6 For a detailed analysis of why money dominates barter and credit as a medium of exchange see Thornton (2000 The dominance of money over barter and credit as means of exchange is reflected in the fact that money continues to function as the primary means of exchange even when the cost of holding it is extremely high, as it is during hyperinflations.
9
The idea that the demand for money is insensitive to changes in the price of money conflicts with the portfolio-balance theory of money which argues that This observation is important because it implies that an individual's demand for money will be relatively insensitive to changes in the cost of holding money. The insensitivity of the use of money to the cost of holding it is a natural consequence of money's dominance over barter and credit as a means of exchange.
7 See Thornton (2000) for more reasons. 8 See Thornton (2000) for other limitations of the usefulness of credit as a method of exchange. 9 See Thornton (2000) for a more complete discussion of reasons for the dominance of money as a means of exchange.
individuals efficiently allocate their assets between interest-bearing bonds and noninterest-bearing money and reallocate wealth between money and debt when interest rates change. There are reasons to be skeptical of the importance of the portfoliobalance effect. For one thing, money is a very poor store of wealth because it is dominated by a wide variety of interest-bearing assets.
10

Money and Prices
Moreover, economic agents are unlikely to significantly reallocate their portfolio between money and bonds in response to a change in interest rates because a) there are no good substitutes for money as a medium of exchange, and b) the benefits from making frequent reallocations, a la ' Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) , are likely to be smaller than the explicit or implicit transactions costs. For example, assume that an individual has an average monthly money balance of $10,000 and the interest rate is 5 percent. A procedure that instantaneously moves funds from interest-bearing assets to noninterest-bearing money at precisely the instant when each transaction occurs would generate an additional $500 annually-$1.37 per day. The typical individual holds considerably less than $10,000 in money balances and costless instantaneous transfers are not possible. While economic models are populated by continuously optimizing economic agents, the real world is not. Hence, while the portfolio-balance effect is conceptually valid, it may have little practical importance.
The central role of money in the exchange of goods and services and financial contracts means that prices are stated in units of money. The price level, in theory and 10 The lack of an appropriate role for money in macroeconomic models is witnessed by Tobin's (1958, p. 65) attempt to justify Keynes' idea of liquidity preference: "Nearly two decades of drawing downward sloping liquidity preference curves in textbooks and on classroom blackboards should not blind us to the basic implausibility of the behavior they describe. Why should anyone hold the noninterest bearing obligations of the government instead of its interest bearing obligations?...What needs to be explained is not only the existence of a demand for cash when its yield is less than the yield on alternative assets but an inverse relationship between the aggregate demand for cash and the size of this differential in yields." Tobin's analysis only justifies money's existence as a store of wealth not its role in practice, is an aggregation (index) of the money prices of commodities. This simple fact necessitates that money is essential for the determination of the price level as we know it. Woodford (2001 Woodford ( , 2003 has challenged this idea suggesting that in a fiat monetary system, money is nothing more than a "unit of account," which is "defined in terms of the liabilities of the central bank." He suggests that
The special feature of central banks, then, is simply that they are entities the liabilities of which happen to be used to define the unit of account in a wide range of contracts that other people exchange with one another. There is perhaps no deep, universal reason why this need be so; it is certainly not essential that there be one such entity per national political unit. Nonetheless, the provision of a well-managed unit of account-one in terms of which the equilibrium prices of many goods and services will be relatively stable-clearly facilitates economic life. And given the evident convenience of having a single unit of account be used by most of the parties with whom one wishes to trade, one may well suppose that this function should properly continue to be taken on by the government.
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Woodford's analysis is misleading in at least two dimensions. First, Woodford sees the fact that the medium of exchange and unit of account functions of money are combined as a mere coincidence, rather than as an outcome of optimizing behavior.
While it is conceptually possible to separate these functions, the same commodity serves both functions because economic efficiency requires it (Thornton, 2000) .
Second, in a fiat monetary system the government is the guarantor of final payment. The government empowers the central bank to control the nominal units of final payment. Of course, this need not be the case. For example, in a commoditymoney world, the commodity that guarantees final payment.
Historically, governments have guaranteed final payment by issuing currency, the use of which is facilitated by declaring it legal tender. While it is not essential, bank deposits and currency typically exchange at a fixed at one-to-one ratio, which in effecting final payment. Money exists because it effectively guarantees final payment, not because is an effective store of wealth, which it isn't. 11 Woodford (2001), p. 346-47. significantly enhances the use of deposits in exchange. The central bank controls the price level by controlling the supply of base money-currency plus deposits at the central bank. Until very recently, the central-bank-deposit component of the monetary base was small and shrinking (e.g., Anderson and Rasche, 2001) . Given advances in technology, I am not sure whether currency will always exist; however, I agree with
Charles Goodhart (2000) that it is unlikely that it will go out of existence anytime soon. In the mean time, as long as the monetary authority controls the aggregate nominal quantity of base money, it can control the price level. While the exchange technology will continue to evolve, I do not believe that there will ever be a world without money-without a generally used method of guaranteeing final payment.
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The existence of fiat money and financial innovation during the last four decades have obscured the relationship between money and economic activity described above and have destroyed relationships between various money aggregates and prices or money growth and inflation, except using very low frequency data. This has undoubted contributed to the conclusion by some economists and policy makers that money is nothing more than an accounting device with no real economic consequences.
Economic efficiency will dictate that money will exist.
The Role of Money in Modern Monetary Theory and Policy
How can money play the essential role outlined above and yet have virtually no significant role in modern macroeconomics and monetary policy?
13 12 It is worth noting that money is never the sole medium of exchange in a monetary economy. Barter is also used; however, its use is limited. Barter is primarily used in the case of second-hand sales of nonhomogenous goods, to avoid taxes, and for illegal transactions.
One possibility is that the role of money described above is simply wrong. I reject this possibility because the role of money outlined in Section 2 is basically what monetary theorists 13 See Hoover (1996) for an analysis that is broadly similar to that presented here.
have believed for some time and still believe. I am inclined to believe that the absence of money in monetary policy is due in part to the fact that economic theorists have yet to develop models that incorporate money's fundamental role in economic activity and price level determination described above. There are several reasons for this;
however, I believe an important reason is existing models start at the wrong place.
Rather than introducing money into a model of exchange where the sole means of exchange is barter (or credit, with non-centralized exchange), and where money arises endogenously to reduce the transactions costs, money is appended to models but given no essential function, i.e., no reason to exist. For example, some "monetary" models start with a framework that incorporates a Walrasian auctioneer. The auctioneer calls out prices in terms of numeraire until all relative prices are determined so that all markets clear.
14 Aware that the Walrasian framework provides no essential role for money, monetary theorists have attempted to capture money's essential role in a variety of Goods are then exchanged. There is no role for money in this framework of "centralized barter." People who have goods that they do not want come to a centralized market to trade these goods for ones that they want once the equilibrium prices (exchange rates) have been determined. There is no need for a generally-used-method-of-guaranteeing-final-payment; final payment is achieved by exchanging goods for goods (i.e., barter). The existence of a centralized market and a very clever auctioneer eliminate the sort of transactions costs that give rise to the social contrivance of money. This synthetic marketplace greatly simplifies economic modeling, but it does not help one understand the importance of money in real-world economies: If real-world economies had economy-wide centralized markets with a clever Walrasian auctioneer, money would not exist.
14 See Thornton (2000, pp. 47-48) for an argument for why the medium of exchange and unit of account functions must coexist and why it is inefficient to guarantee payment in anything other than the ways. One is the "cash-in-advance economy," where money is required for all transactions. However, because money does not exist because it reduces transactions costs, economic welfare can be enhanced simply by removing the constraint, i.e., removing money. The problem, of course, is money has no essential function, i.e., it does not arise endogenously to mitigate some of the costs of trade. Hence, rather than enhancing individual and social welfare,e money is a welfare-reducing constraint:
everyone would be better off if they were not required to use money to make their otherwise costless transactions.
Theorists have attempted to capture money's essential role in other ways such as including money in a household's utility function or a producer's production function. The money-in-the-utility-function approach simply asserts that individuals get utility from holding money, even though money plays no essential role in the economy. All other things the same, the more money individuals have the better they feel. In essence, money is as a store of wealth. The problem is that non-interest bearing money is dominated by interest-assets as a store of wealth. Non-interestbearing money would not exist if its sole purpose was to transfer wealth intertemporally. There are far too many assets that can perform this function at a lower cost.
The money-in-the-production-function models simply require that money be used in the production of goods. All other things equal, the more money the producer has, the greater the level of output. Like the money-in-the-utility-function approach, such models fail to explain both the reason money is required for production, and the exact mechanism by which money increases production; they merely assert that it does.
unit of account.
There has been considerable effort during the past few decades to improve macroeconomics and monetary theory by providing it with stronger microeconomic foundations. This effort has generated some useful insights; however, it has yet to produce a model that adequately reflects money's essential role in economic activity.
I believe the reason for this shortcoming is that the representative agent frameworkwhich is the sine qua non of these models-is devoid of agent-by-agent modeling and equilibrium heterogeneity that is essential for realistic microeconomic analyses (e.g., Hoover, 1996 , and Forni and Lippi, 1997 , and Solow, 2008 The belief that money is irrelevant for monetary policy or the determination of the price level has been exacerbated by the fact that a close empirical link between money growth and short run output and inflation is only observable in economies where money (or currency) is the principal means of exchange. The development of financial markets is due to the existence of money. Unfortunately, the more advanced financial markets become the less obvious it is that money matters for economic activity and the determination of the price level. The irony is that while the existence of money is essential for economic growth, the development of goods and financial markets, the division and specialization of labor, etc., the more advanced economies become the more it looks like money is irrelevant. In economies where money in the form of cash is essential for the bulk of everyday transactions, say modern day China, it is less easy to argue that money is irrelevant. The oxygen/fire analogy is compelling but not causal. The analytical framework outlined in Section 2, however, suggests a causal link from money to inflation-"too" much money will "cause" inflation. flexible and the economy is in equilibrium, a change in the nominal money stock has no effect on the equilibrium values of real variables. Neutrality gave rise to the "classical dichotomy," the idea the real and monetary aspects of economic activity could be modeled separately. The equilibrium real quantity of money is endogenous and depends on the equilibrium quantities of real variables that are independent of the nominal supply of money in equilibrium. This means that a model that attempts to reflect how the economy re-equilibrates following a change in the nominal money supply will be highly model specific. The modeling problem is exacerbated by the invariance principle (e.g. Archibald and Lipsey, 1958, and Clower and Burstein, 1960 )-the fact that the equilibrium outcome is invariant to how the supply is increased.
If excess monetary base growth were not inflationary, societies could solve a lot of problems very quickly and at essentially no cost by simply increasing the supply of money.
Monetary Policy: Why Interest Rates Don't Matter
The previous sections have argued that: a) money exists for the simple reason that it is the most efficient method of achieving final payment in exchange, b) the existence of money is essential for the development of goods and financial markets, c)
any marked deterioration in the money-payment system would "cripple" economic 23 
Reason for Skepticism, a): Monetary Policy and the Supply of Credit
Consequently, the efficacy of the interest rate channel is significantly impaired if policy actions with respect to the funds rate are not transmitted throughout the interest rate structure. The efficacy of the interest rate channel of monetary policy is based on two fundamental propositions: a) that the Fed can and has controlled the overnight federal funds rate; and b) that policy-induced changes in the overnight rate are transmitted throughout the structure of rates. This section discusses several reasons to be skeptical of either proposition. However, any significant doubt about a) is sufficient reason to doubt the efficacy of the interest rate channel.
A well-known economist and policymaker once asked me why I was skeptical of the Fed's ability to affect interest rates, indicating that the demand for money being a function of the interest rate was sufficient. I responded incorrectly, saying that the interest elasticity of the demand for money was a necessary but not sufficient condition for monetary policy to have a significant effect on interest rates. In reality the interest elasticity of money demand is neither necessary nor sufficient. It is not necessary because the interest rate is the price of credit, not the price of money (i.e., the price level.) 25 The Fed's lending and investing activities not only change the supply of money, they also change the supply of credit. When the Fed makes loans or purchases assets (any asset) it alters the total supply of credit by the amount of the loan or asset purchase. It is this effect of monetary policy actions that causes interest rates to change. Interest rates would change even if the demand for money were independent of the interest rate. Hence, the interest elasticity of the demand for money is not necessary for monetary policy actions to affect interest rates. The effect of monetary policy actions on the supply of credit is sufficient for interest rates to change.
I will argue that the ability of monetary policy to affect interest rates is a consequence of the effect of policy actions on the supply of credit, not on the supply of money.
The Fed's contribution to the total supply of credit is given by the size of its balance sheet or, more generally, by the size of the (adjusted) monetary base. The
Fed's contribution to the supply of credit is considerably smaller than its contribution to the supply of money because of the fractional reserve banking system. market prices, such as longer-term interest rates, equity prices, and exchange rates." Also, see Woodford (2005) for a discussion of the relationship between the funds rate target and long-term rates. 25 The fact that the demand for money is a function of the interest rate only implies that whatever the equilibrium rate is, the demand for money must be consistent with it. As an aside, for reasons discussed in Section 2, the demand for money is likely to be relatively interest insensitive. I would also note that When the Fed increases the supply of credit by increasing loans to banks or purchasing securities, the initial effect will be on short-term rates, with the largest effect on the federal funds rate. This effect is propagated to the rest of the financial traditional arguments for why money demand depends on the interest rate are not compelling (e.g., Laidler, 1993) .
Given the relatively small size of the Fed's contribution to the total credit supply, a priori, it is hard to see how the Fed could significantly affect the equilibrium level of interest rates. Cochrane (2011) and Bauer and Rudebusch (2011) recently have used the identical argument to question the effectiveness of the FOMC's quantitative easing (QE) actions on interest rates, and these actions are immense relative to historical policy actions. Friedman (1999) argues that the Fed's contribution to the total supply of credit is implausibly small to have a significant effect on interest rates. 27 He suggests that the central bank's ability to control interest rates does not depend on its contribution to the total supply of credit, but is a consequence of the fact that the Fed "is a monopoly supplier (and withdrawer) of reserves." Specifically, he argues that "when the monopolist central bank reduces the supply of reserves, banks therefore must reduce the amount of money that they supply to households and firms. As households and firms compete with one another to hold the now shrunken supply of money, their individual efforts to sell securities for money cannot produce any more money but do, collectively, drive the price of securities down-that is, they drive interest rates up." 28 Friedman's (1999) analysis is a partial equilibrium analysis, however. To understand why being the monopoly supplier of reserves does change the fact the effect of Fed actions on the equilibrium structure of interest rates depends on its contribution to the total supply of credit it is important to realize that the federal funds market is not segmented from the rest of the credit market as it once was. Figure 4 shows the federal funds rate, the 3-month T-bill rate, and the discount rate from January 1955 through October 1978. Until the late 1960s the discount rate was an effective ceiling for the funds rate, but not for the T-bill rate. When the T-bill rate (and other short-term rates) rose above the discount rate, the funds rate would not.
The reason is that prior to the mid-to-late 1960s, the federal funds market was segmented from the rest of the credit market because banks used the market for the sole purpose of meeting their statutory reserve requirements. Banks with reserve 27 Friedman (1999 ), p. 325. 28 Friedman (1999 deficiencies could either go to the discount window or borrow reserves from another bank in the federal funds market. Banks would borrow in the funds market when the fund rate was below the discount, but go to the discount window if the funds rate was higher than the discount rate-the discount rate was an effective ceiling for the funds rate.
This characteristic feature of the relationship between the funds rate and the discount rate began to change in the mid-to-late 1960s. At first the funds rate went above the discount rate on only a few occasions; however, by the late 1960s, the funds rate was frequently and then consistently above the discount rate. This relationship changed because large banks began using the federal funds market as a continuous source of funds for lending (Meulendyke, 1998) . The marked change in the relationship between the discount and federal funds rates was an endogenous response of large Banks when Regulation Q interest rate ceilings began to bind in the mid1960s. Finding it increasingly difficult to meet all of their funding needs in the market for certificate of deposits (CDs), large banks increasingly they turned to the overnight federal funds market as a permanent source of funds.
As federal funds and CDs became closer substitutes, the Fed's ability to affect the federal funds rate by making modest adjustments to the supply of credit necessarily changed. The following simple thought experiment explains why. Assume that the Fed increases the supply of reserves by purchasing government securities.
The initial effect of an open market purchase is on banks' deposit balances with the
Fed and, consequently, on the funds rate. The lower federal funds rate creates an arbitrage opportunity. Banks find it more advantageous to meet their funding needs in the federal funds market relative to the CD market. This causes the funds rate to rise and the CD rate to fall. In order to keep the funds rate at the lower target level, the Fed would find it necessary to increase the supply of reserves further. But this creates another arbitrage opportunity causing the Fed to further increase the supply of credit.
This process would continue until the equilibrium funds rate was at the lower target level and the structural relation between the funds and CD rates was reestablished.
The difficulty in controlling the funds rate is exacerbated by the degree of substitution between CDs and other short-term debt instruments. Consequently, the Fed would have to increase the supply of credit by whatever amount is necessary to bring the funds rate down to the new target level, while leaving the equilibrium structure of rates unchanged. In general, the ability of a change in the supply of a specific asset to affect the equilibrium interest rate of that asset depends on the size of the market for the asset, the interest elasticity of demand for the asset, and the cross elasticity of demand with the rest of the credit market. All other things the same, the effect on the federal funds rate will be larger the more the funds market is segmented from the rest of the credit market. Prior to the mid-to-late 1960s, the federal funds market was completely segmented from the rest of the credit market: Banks only used the federal funds market to meet their reserve requirements. Consequently, the Fed could produce a relatively large change in the funds rate with a relative small open market operation. This has not been the case since the late 1960s, however.
Of course, the more segmented the market, the larger the effect of a policy action on the funds rate, but the smaller the effect on interest rates that matter most for economic activity: Having a larger effect on the funds rate means having a smaller effect on economically important interest rates and, hence, economic activity. In any event, if the effect of policy actions on interest rates is small because their effect on the total supply of credit is small, being a monopoly supplier of reserves does not alter this fact.
Some might argue that this paradigm cannot account for the historically close relationship between the federal funds rate and the FOMC's funds rate "target" observed in the data-a relationship that occurred without massive changes in the supply of reserves. It is important to note, however, that prior to the late 1980s/early 1990s the Fed did not use the funds rate as a policy instrument (e.g., in the sense of a policy rule, like a Taylor rule). Rather the funds rate was an operating instrument. It was used to gauge money market conditions and for conducting daily open market operations. Consequent with this hypothesis, the FOMC's funds rate "target" was adjusted relatively frequently and quickly with change in short-term rates.
In essence, the FOMC's funds rate target was largely endogenous (Fama, 2012) . This hypothesis is supported by Figure 5 which shows the daily effective funds rate and the funds rate target for the period September 12, 1974, through October 5, 1979, a period when it is widely accepted that the FOMC was "targeting" the federal funds rate.
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The funds-rate-control interpretation is significantly weakened by the fact that the "target" was adjusted very frequently-99 times during this period; an average of a change every 2.5 weeks. Such frequent adjustments are difficult to reconcile with With the exception of some large spikes, most of which occurred on Settlement Wednesdays (the day when the maintenance period reserve requirement is binding), ends of quarters, or year's end, the relationship between the funds rate and the funds rate target is remarkably close. Indeed, if one excludes Settlement
Wednesdays and the first and last days of the year, the average absolute daily difference between the funds rate and the target is 8.5 basis points. This close relationship has prompted some analysts to conclude that the Fed successfully controlled the funds rate. 29 The target comes from Rudebusch (1995a,b) .
the idea that the FOMC used the funds rate as a policy instrument in the sense of a Taylor-style rule. However, they are consistent with the fact that interest rates were relatively volatile during the period, and the idea that the target was adjusted to keep it in line with other short-term rates.
The endogeneity hypothesis is also supported by the fact that the FOMC did not set a specific target for the funds rate. Rather, the "target" shown in Figure 5 is the mid-point of a "target range," of 50 to 75 basis points. The hypothesis is further supported by the fact that most of the target changes during this period were made by the trading desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in consultation with the Chairman, and not by the FOMC. These facts together with Thornton's (2004) finding, that Treasury rates responded only on days when the market was informed of the target change in the Wall Street Journal and not on days when there was no announcement, provides relatively strong support for the endogeneity hypothesis.
30 Thornton (2006) shows that by late 1982 the FOMC began focusing more attention on the funds rate in their policy discussions. Initially the FOMC was using the funds rate much as it had during the 1974-79 period. However, as the usefulness of monetary and credit aggregates deteriorated, the FOMC increasingly focused on the funds rate in its policy deliberations. Thornton (2006 Thornton ( , 2012a shows that by the late 1980s the FOMC was starting to use the funds rate as a policy instrument in the 30 The belief that the Fed caused changes in the funds rate is spported by Cook and Hahn's (1989) finding that Treasury rates along the yield curve responded statistically significantly to Wall Street Journal (WSJ) announcements of target changes. However, Thornton (2004) shows that only about 40 percent of the target changes identified by the WSJ coincide with target changes reported by Rudebusch (1995a,b) . Importantly, he found no statistically significant relationship between changes in the 3-month T-bill rate and Rudebusch-identified target changes that were not announced in the WSJ. Hence, Cook and Hahn's results appear to be due to an announcement effect rather than to open-marketoperations induced change in interest rates.
sense of a Taylor-style rule. 31 The evolution to funds rate targeting was acknowledged by Greenspan at the July 1997 FOMC:
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As you may recall, we fought off that apparently inevitable day as long as we could. We ran into the situation, as you may remember, when the money supply, nonborrowed reserves, and various other non-interestrate measures on which the Committee had focused had in turn fallen by the wayside. We were left with interest rates because we had no alternative. I think it is still in a sense our official policy that if we can find a way back to where we are able to target the money supply or net borrowed reserves or some other non-interest measure instead of the federal funds rate, we would like to do that. I am not sure we will be able to return to such a regime...but the reason is not that we enthusiastically embrace targeting the federal funds rate. We did it as an unfortunate fallback when we had no other options...
The change in the FOMC's use of the funds rate is reflected in the relationship between the funds rate and the FOMC's funds rate target shown in Figure 6 , which plots the average monthly difference between the federal funds rate and the FOMC's funds rate target from January 1983 through March 2007. Consistent with Greenspan's statement, deviations from the funds rate target were relatively large until the late 1980s. The large deviations occurred in spite of the fact that target adjustments were relatively frequent; from January 1983 through December 1989, a change occurred about every 2.5 months.
33
As was the case during the 1973-79 period, prior to the early 1990s, the target was the mid-point of a range, many of the target changes were in reaction to changing market conditions (Thornton, 2005b) . Moreover, most target changes were made during the intermeeting period. Hence, prior to at least the late 1980s it is arguably the case that the funds rate target was essentially endogenous. 31 However, Meade and Thornton (2012) find no evidence that the FOMC implemented policy using a specific policy rule. 32 A more detailed accounting of the evolution to using the funds rate as a policy instrument can be found in Thornton (2006 Thornton ( , 2010b . 33 That target changes were less frequent than during the 1973-79 period may simply reflect the fact that interest rates were less variable.
After the late 1980s target changes were less frequent and target changes were made in response to economic conditions (Thornton, 2010b) . Importantly, the market was becoming increasingly aware of the FOMC's use of the funds rate to implement policy.
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Empirical investigations of the effect of open market operations on the federal funds rate using daily data (e.g., Hamilton, 1997; Thornton, 2001ab, 2004 Thornton, 2001ab, , 2007 and Carpenter and Demiralp, 2006) show that open market operations had at best a modest effect on the federal funds rate. This evidence is also consistent with the funds rate target being endogenous until the late 1980s and the funds rate increasingly being determined by open mouth operations thereafter. More generally, the liquidity effect-the response of interest rates to an exogenous, policy-induced change in the supply of credit-has been extremely difficult to isolate at any frequency (Hamilton, 1997) .
Hence, the tightening of relationship between the funds rate and the funds rate target was due to open mouth operations rather than open market operations: The FOMC only had to announce a target change and the funds rate adjusted without changing the supply of credit using open market operations. As the FOMC became increasingly specific about the level of the funds rate target the relationship tightened and the funds rate changed immediately when target changes were effectively announced (Taylor, 2001; Friedman, 1999 Friedman, , 2000 Woodford, 1999) .
35 34 Based on an analysis of the Wall Street Journal a few days prior to and after FOMC meeting, Poole, et al., (2002) , concluded that "despite the increased awareness that the Fed was paying attention to the funds rate in conducting monetary policy, there is little indication that the market was aware that the Fed was setting an explicit objective for the federal funds rate before 1989."
This fact alone should cause economists and policymakers to question the degree to which such policy actions directly affect interest rates.
Reason for Skepticism, b): Monetary Policy and the Structure of Rates
Increased control over the funds rate through open mouth operations does not necessarily translate into control over other interest rates. The theoretical basis for controlling the interest rate structure by controlling the overnight federal funds rate is the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates (EH). Unfortunately, the EH has been rejected using a variety of interest rates, time periods, monetary policy regimes, etc. (e.g., Campbell and Shiller, 1991; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005; Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall, 1997; Sarno, Valente, and Thornton, 2007; and Thornton, 2005a and the literature therein).
The empirical relevance of the EH depends critically on the ability of market participants to predict the future short-term rate. However, short-term rates are very difficult to predict beyond their current level (e.g., Guidolin and Thornton, 2010) . If market participants are unable to predict the future short-term interest rate with any reasonable degree of accuracy, there is no particular reason to believe that longer-term rates should be tightly linked to the short-term policy rate. Woodford (1999 Woodford ( , 2012 argues that the effectiveness of a central bank's interest rate policy could be enhanced if the policy rate was more inertial. That is, policymakers could affect interest rates further out on the term structure by credibly committing to a path for the short-term rate. Woodford's suggestion has prompted several central banks, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Norges Bank, the Riksbank, the Czech National Bank, and the Federal Reserve to adopt what is called forward guidance, i.e., announcing a path for the policy rate. The evidence suggests that forward guidance has been relatively ineffective, however. Anderson and Hoffman (2010) , Goodhart and Lim (2008) , and Kool and Thornton (2012) find little or no improvement in the predictability of short-term rates or longer-term yields.
It is important to note that nearly all of the work on the EH has looked solely at the term structure of sovereign debt, a relatively thin slice of an enormously complex interest rate structure. The yields that matter most for economic activity are private debt yields. Hence, the important question for the efficacy of monetary policy is whether and to what extent forward guidance has enhanced policymakers' ability to affect yields on private securities. Empirical analyses using a wide range of private rates have been limited and they have focused on high-frequency announcement effects, which may overstate the permanent effect (Wright, 2011) .
The EH assumes perfect substitutability across assets in the term structure.
This is a reasonable assumption for default-risk-free Treasury debt, but less reasonable across the entire structure of debt instruments. A priori, the degree of substitutability among any set of debt instruments is a declining function of the degree of heterogeneity among instruments in the set. The more heterogeneous two debt instruments are, the lower the degree of substitutability between them, i.e., the rate changes in one market will be reflected in another. Market segmentation provides the theoretical basis for the FOMC's large-scale asset purchase policy, QE, and its revival of Operation Twist-buying long-term government securities and selling an equal quantity of short-term government securities. The degree to which the credit market is segmented is open to debate. The point to be made here is that while market segmentation increases the impact of the Fed's relatively small operations in particular segments of the market, it limits the Fed's ability to affect bond yields throughout the market more generally. If there is significant segmentation between the short-and long-ends of the market for Treasuries, segmentation would likely be even stronger between Treasuries and important segments of the retail securities market. Consequently, while market segmentation may enable the Fed to have a larger effect on longer-term Treasury yields, this does not necessarily translate into an increase the efficacy of policy.
Regardless of the empirical validity of the EH or the degree of market segmentation, Thornton (2010b) has shown that the marked improvement in the relationship between the funds rate and the FOMC's funds rate target since the late 1980s has been accompanied by a marked deterioration in the relationship between the federal funds rate and longer-term Treasury rates. This is illustrated in Table 1 , which presents estimates of Moreover, when the common trends in the rates are accounted for, the marked break in the relationship between changes in Treasury yields and changes in the funds rate is reflected in the levels of these rates as well. This is illustrated in Figure 8 , which shows the de-trended federal funds rate and 10-year Treasury yield over the Thornton (2010b) hypothesizes that the marked change in the relationship between the funds rate and the 10-year Treasury yield is a consequence of the FOMC's use of the funds rate as a policy instrument. He presents evidence from a variety of sources that supports this hypothesis. Whether one finds Thornton's hypothesis and evidence convincing, the marked change in the relationships among the federal funds rate and various Treasury rates that he documents cannot be ignored.
Nor can its implication: greater control over the funds rate does not necessarily translate into more control over other interest rates.
Conclusions
I argue that money matters for monetary policy because money is essential for economic activity and for the determination of the price level. Unfortunately, money's essential role is not adequately reflected in modern theory. I attribute this to: a) the difficulties associated with constructing models that capture the indispensability of money for economic activity and yet accompany money's neutrality, b) the fact that the more sophisticated financial markets become the less obvious it is that money is essential, c) the lack of a strong statistically significant relationship between money and economic activity or inflation, and d) the exaggerated belief in the ability of the Fed to control interest rates. As a consequence, prominent macro/monetary economists have unified around a model where, at best, money is implicit and, at worst, nonexistent. As a consequence, nearly all central banks implement monetary policy using a short-term interest rate; few pay attention to monetary aggregates in formulating or implementing policy.
My analysis the Fed's actions and the role of the federal funds markets suggest that the Fed's ability to control interest rates is exaggerated for the simple reason that 31 historically the effect of policy actions on the total supply of credit has been too small to have a significant effect on the level of the entire structure of interest rates. The relative inability to influence yields more generally is illustrated by the fact that the marked improvement in the relationship between the federal funds rate and the FOMC's funds rate target since the late 1980s was accompanied by marked deterioration in the relationship between the funds rate and longer-term Treasury yields.
The analysis suggests that the efficacy of monetary policy for countercyclical stabilization policy is much less effective than is commonly believed. Nevertheless, money is essential for controlling the price level. Hence, by aggressively pursuing countercyclical stabilization policymakers run a significant risk of missing on their inflation objective. An important implication of the analysis is policymakers would do well to have a single objective, price stability. 
